The Supreme Court Tuesday refused to accord urgent hearing to Congress leader Hardik Patel's plea challenging the Gujarat High Court order rejecting stay on his conviction in the 2015 Vispur rioting case.

The matter was mentioned for urgent listing before a bench headed by Justice Arun Mishra.

The bench also comprising Justices M M Shantanagoudar and Navin Sinha told the counsel appearing for Patel that there was no urgency in hearing the matter as the high court order was passed in August last year.

"The order was passed in August 2018. What is the urgency now?" the bench said while refusing to accord urgent hearing on the petition.

Patel, 25, had started preparations to contest from Jamnagar on a Congress ticket after joining the party on March 12 and the last date for filing of nominations is April 4.

The Supreme Court today struck down the circular issued by the Reserve Bank of India on February 12, 2018  directing banks to initiate insolvency proceedings against companies having bad debts of Rs 2000 crores or above.

The February 12 circular had directed banks to resolve debts over Rs 2000 crores within 180 days, failing which the corporate debtor would have to be taken to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) for insolvency action.Among other things, the Circular mandated that banks will have to disclose defaults even if the interest repayment is overdue by just one day, and will have to put a resolution plan in place within 180 days. All the extant debt resolutions mechanisms such as the CDR, SDR, S4A and JLF were also abolished by the RBI.

The implementation of the circular would have taken  several companies in the fields of power, sugar, shipping etc., including giants like Essar Power, GMR Energy, KSK Energy and Rattan India Power to insolvency.

In a major relief to these sectors, the SC bench of Justices R F Nariman and Vineet Saran today quashed the circular holding that a generic circular directing banks to take recourse to Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was beyond the powers of Section 35AA of the Banking Regulation Act. The Court held that reference to IBC can be made only on a case to case basis, and that there cannot be a blanket direction to that effect. Detailed judgment is awaited.

The Circular was challenged by petitioners such as The Association of Power Producers (APP) and Independent Power Producers Association of India as suffering from non-application of mind, as it failed to draw a distinction between various forms of "stressed assets" from different industrial sectors. They further contended that the circular failed to distinguish between genuine and wilful defaulters.

The Supreme Court has set aside the Delhi High Court order which granted bail to Jammu and Kashmir based influential businessman Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali in Terror funding case.

In the judgment of the Supreme Court which quashed the general circular of Reserve Bank of India issued on February 12, 2018 on insolvency process against stressed assets, much turned on whether the power to issue such circular flew from Section 35A or Section 35AA of the Banking Regulation Act.

While Section 35A talks about general powers of RBI to issue directions to banking companies, Section 35AA gives power to the Central Government to authorize RBI to direct any bank to initiate insolvency process in respect of a default.

The petitioners, which comprised association of companies from the sectors of power, sugar, shipping, etc, argued that the direction in February 12 circular to initiate insolvency process if bad debts over Rs.2000 crores are not resolved within 180 days could not have been issued without the authorization of the central government. The RBI sought to sustain the circular by tracing its source to the general powers under Section 35A, instead of Section 35AA, which is inserted as per 2017 amendment. Since no authorization from Central Government is needed to exercise powers under Section 35A, the circular was valid, argued the RBI.

Though the judgment agreed that Section 35A could be a source of power for the impugned circular, it said that after the insertion of Section 35AA in 2017 with a specific condition of authorization from central government, recourse cannot be made to general powers under Section 35A for issuing directions to take insolvency action in respect of bad debts.

The bench of Justices R F Nariman and Vineet Saran explained the position as follows :

"Section 35AA makes it clear that the Central Government may, by order, authorise the RBI to issue directions to any banking company or banking companies when it comes to initiating the insolvency resolution process under the provisions of the Insolvency Code. The first thing to be noted is that without such authorisation, the RBI would have no such power...."

"The corollary of this is that prior to the enactment of Section 35AA, it may have been possible to say that when it comes to the RBI issuing directions to a banking company to initiate insolvency resolution process under the Insolvency Code, it could have issued such directions under Sections 21 and 35A. But after Section 35AA, it may do so only within the four corners of Section 35AA." 

The Court further applied the principle that when a statute prescribes a specific manner for doing a thing, it should be done only in that specified manner.

"If a statute confers power to do a particular act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any manner other than that which has been prescribed.

Following this principle, therefore, it is clear that the RBI can only direct banking institutions to move under the Insolvency Code if two conditions precedent are specified, namely, (i) that there is a Central Government authorisation to do so; and (ii) that it should be in respect of specific defaults. The Section, therefore, by necessary implication, prohibits this power from being exercised in any manner other than the manner set out in Section 35AA."

The Court also held that Section 35AB, which spoke of powers of RBI to issue directions for resolution of stressed assets, cannot be a source of power for the circular. That Section, which opened with the words "without prejudice to", was held to be a general provision, which is to be read along with Section 35A. It was held that Section 35AB dealt with directions for debt resolution outside Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code(IBC).

"Therefore, the scheme of Sections 35A, 35AA, and 35AB is as follows: (a) When it comes to issuing directions to initiate the insolvency resolution process under the Insolvency Code, Section 35AA is the only source of power. (b) When it comes to issuing directions in respect of stressed assets, which directions are directions other than resolving this problem under the Insolvency Code, such power falls within Section 35A read with Section 35AB.", explained the judgment authored by Justice R F Nariman.

Section 35AA can be used only in respect of specific debts

The general application of Circular to all debts above Rs. 2000 crores was challenged by petitioners as suffering from non-application of mind, as it failed to draw a distinction between various forms of "stressed assets" from different industrial sectors. They further contended that the circular failed to distinguish between genuine and wilful defaulters.

The Court held that reference to IBC under Section 35AA can be made only on a case to case basis, and that there cannot be a blanket direction to that effect. This was because Section 35AA used the phrase "in respect of a default".  'Default' has been given the same meaning as in Section 3(12) of IBC.

"...what is important to note is that it is a particular default of a particular debtor that is the subject matter of Section 35AA", observed the Court.

The Press Note dated 05.05.2017 along with the 2017 Ordinance(which introduced Section 35AA , 35AB) specifically referred to resolution of "specific" stressed assets which will empower the RBI to intervene in "specific" cases of resolution of NPAs. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing Section 35AA also emphasises that directions are in respect of "a default". 

 "Thus, it is clear that directions that can be issued under Section 35AA can only be in respect of specific defaults by specific debtors. This is also the understanding of the Central Government when it issued the notification dated 05.05.2017, which authorised the RBI to issue such directions only in respect of "a default" under the Code. Thus, any directions which are in respect of debtors generally, would be ultra vires Section 35AA", held the Court.

The circular was struck down, and all proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC taken by financial creditors on the basis of it were declared as "non-est".

The manifest legal infirmity in the circular forced the Court to consciously step away from the "judicial hand's off approach vis-à-vis economic regulation" and proceed to quash the circular..

Read Judgment

The Supreme Court has held that the incorporation of one-sided clauses in a builder-buyer agreement constitutes an unfair trade practice as per Section 2 (r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

The proposal to create two bureaucratic panels to receive complaints against CICs will reduce the CIC to the level of a glorified clerk without glory. It is a ridiculous proposal to make such 'officers' who are supposed to obey the directions of ICs and CIC, as superior authorities to inquire into the complaints against CICs. This is another conspiratorial attempt to kill the institution, which was asking the Government offices to disclose the corruption and other cases against its officers. Its totally against the RTI Act, and violative of letter and spirit of our democratic constitution which gave independence to information tribunal. It is bureaucracy's desperate attempt to annex the transparency panel under their hierarchy.

As Attorney General K. K. Venugopal resumed his submissions on the constitutionality of the passage as a Money Bill of the Finance Act of 2017 on Monday, Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi asked for a copy of the Supreme Court's order in Rajiv Garg, where the court had considered whether different conditions of service could be prescribed for different tribunals.

In that case, the court had taken on record the assurance of the then-AG to speak with the different ministries as to uniformity in the retirement, functional facilities and accommodation of the Chairman and members of different tribunals.

AG Venugopal pointed out that in the order, the court had required that the Centre fulfill its commitment, as communicated through the then-AG and the then-Solicitor General, regarding the discrepancies in tenures and other conditions of services of the Members and Presiding Officers of the different Tribunals. "Pursuant to this, the (Finance) Act was passed", said the Mr. Venugopal.

He moved on to show how the Bill was returned to the Lok Sabha by the Upper House with certain recommendations, which were not accepted and that it was finally passed on March 30, 2017, to receive the assent of the President a day later- "none of the (recommended) amendments applied to Part XIV (on the merger of Tribunals and the conditions of service of their Chairperson/Members)", he emphasized.

Indicating the long title of the Act- "An Act to give effect to the financial proposals of the Central Government for the financial year 2017-2018"- he argued that it was certified as a Financial Bill in the whole and not as to any part of it, adding that no portion of the law can be severed provided it is covered under sub-clause (g) of Article 110.

In context of Article 110, which defines 'Money Bill', he advanced,

"So far as sub-clauses (a) to (f) are concerned, they deal with some specific subjects and the bill has to be related only to what has been set out in them. But as for sub-clause (g), it can be any matter, not necessarily subject-oriented, but in relation to (a)-(f). Incidental matters can be relatable to any matter but must have connection to (a)-(f). If there is a payment from or a receipt in the Consolidated Fund of India (CFI), then it will be incidental to (a)-(f). For each one of these tribunals (in Schedule 8 of the Act), the total expenditure is up to 100 crores on salaries and allowances which are paid out of the CFI. Hence, the Finance Act is a money bill as it also comprehends in its scope a matter which is related to (a)-(f)"

"Further, the persons manning the tribunals which have been abolished have to be paid a certain amount and that is covered by section 185. They are entitled to a compensation not exceeding three months' pay and this comes to over a crore of rupees. Also, the balance of all monies received by such a Tribunal and not spent before its abolition shall stand transferred to the Central government. Now, the Central government can't hold money and as such, the entirety of the funds would go to the CFI by virtue of Article 266"

"The entirety of the salaries are being withdrawn from the CFI and the said receipts of the Central government are also being paid into it. 110(1)(c) deals with payments of money into or withdrawals from the CFI. But the (2017 Act's) provisions are not exclusively relatable to this and hence, I have to go to (g). With this, see 110(2). What is significantly omitted from clause (2) is salaries, allowances and pensions. While (a) has been excluded, (c) and (d) have been otherwise included (for qualifying as a Money Bill)", he continued.

"I am treating 110(2) as a proviso to clause (1). Because 110(1) starts by saying 'a bill shall be deemed to be a Money Bill' and (2) starts with 'a bill shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill'. So (2) is an exception to (1). If there is a bill regarding payments out of the CFI by way of salaries, allowances and pensions, it will come under a main provision of (1), which would be most appropriately (g)"

"These payments which are not excluded by 110(2) will necessarily be provisions incidental to and covered by the Finance Act...it has rightfully found a place in (g) as a matter incidental to any of the sub-clauses (a)-(f), specifically (c) and (d)".

Referring to section 7 of the Aadhaar Act of 2017, (which speaks of 'subsidies', 'benefits' and 'services' in respect of which expenditure would be incurred on the CFI and in view of which the Aadhaar Act was held to be a Money Bill by another five-judge bench last year), he advanced that even if it is not so specifically mentioned, there can't be a single case where a payment by the Central government would not involve a payment out of the CFI by virtue of Article 266. He pointed out that in the Aadhaar case, the majority was of the view that all other provisions of the Act are incidental to this Section 7 and thus, protected by Article 110.

"The amount which is involved is not the criteria- it may be 1000 crores or even 100 crores. 110 takes no note of it. But the Majority judgment (in Aadhaar) covers my case. There is a direct nexus between Part XXIV and the provisions of (g) read with (a) to (f), and accordingly, the Finance Act has been justly certified as a money bill...", he submitted.

Next, Mr. Venugopal addressed the claim of excess delegation to the Centre in respect of appointments, removal, qualifications, tenure and other conditions of service of the Presiding Officers and the Members of the Tribunals. In this behalf, He relied on the 1958 D. S. Garewal decision, where the argument of excess delegation under the All-India Services Act (section 3 of which empowers the Central Government to, after consultation with the state Governments concerned, make rules for the regulation of recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to an all-India service) did not find favour with a constitution bench of the apex court.

"The All-India Services Act (AIS) is an Act passed by the Parliament under Article 312(1) and it also provides for rules to be framed by the Central government", he averred.

He indicated certain other provisions of the Finance Act to the effect that the salaries, allowances and other conditions of service of the Chairperson and the Members shall not be varied to their disadvantage after the appointment; that in case of an amalgamation of tribunals, the officers and other employees shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges as to pension and gratuity; and that every rule framed under Part XXIV shall be laid down before the Parliament.

"We are facing the same situation as in the AIS Act. Services were governed by statutory rules under the government of India Act. When the constitution came, the parliament was authorised to make rules as to conditions of service and the delegation in that behalf was held to be valid", was his case.

At this juncture, Justice D. Y. Chandrachud reflected,

"The service conditions of all tribunals have been laid down by specific acts. What the finance act now does is that in respect of all acts in its 8th schedule, it makes a delegation to the Central government. The moment the Central government makes rules, they would prevail over the parent provisions, even as the acts still continue and are not amended. The moment the rules are framed, the non-obstante clause of 183 and 184 kicks in...the moment the Central government amends the schedule by an executive act, then again the parent act is superseded"

"The conditions of service would be only one part of all statutes- the overlapping of the rules would only be as to a minimal part...Even if a merger of tribunals takes place, neither would disappear- it would be just two tribunals being managed by one set of people...This would not be very different from what is happening under AIS...", replied the AG.

"The Constitution itself empowers the President and Governor to frame rules till the act is passed (under Article 309). But here, where the legislation has been passed, can you amend the Acts by rules?", asked Justice Sanjeev Khanna.

In response, The AG again sought to show that there is no over-delegation in as much as these rules framed by the Central government under the Finance Act are concerned-

"These are not Article 309 rules. For example, The industrial disputes act specifies the qualifications of the Chairman and the members, then rules would be made under that act for the purpose of the conditions of service, the tenure etc based on the nature of the tribunal.
"Over a period of two years, this court has examined the rules (under the Finance Act) and modified them and brought into existence an altogether new set of rules by a series of interim order", he iterated.

The AG, on Monday, also advanced how the persons recruited to man these Tribunals are lawyers, retired judges who are now practicing and accountants and how today they are all claiming a status equivalent to a High Court judge-

"Even in the Lokpal, houses, 4 Leave Travel Concessions and staff has to be assigned. The burden on the exchequer is huge!...Every committee is making such claims- 'Why the Secretary to the government of India gets a much lesser Leave Travel Concession while the others are getting four?'"

"There are claims because the Chairman of several of these Tribunals has to be a retired Supreme Court judge and the status of a Supreme Court judge has to be given to him. Because of this, the technical members also start claiming...a retired judge, once he completes his tenure, it is entirely unto him to take up an alternative employment...", observed Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi.

In as much as a Selection Committee reviews the Members after the five-year tenure, the Chief Justice weighed in,

"Suppose a man gets into a tribunal and is not performing well from day 1. You would wait for 5 years? Why should incompetence be tolerated till then?"

"There also must be a sense of security. The other alternative is 3 years. But we can't change the conditions of service of those already holding office", replied the AG.

"Whether this is a money bill, it is not very difficult to decide. Similar is the issue of excessive delegation. You tried to bring in uniformity and in the process, there has been an encroachment by the rules, which you say have been corrected by interim orders. Now whether these tribunal rules which apply across the board are a breach of [unclear] is the question...Suppose there are twenty tribunals, it is desired to have uniformity as to the conditions of tenure, status and salaries. But what we have today is absolute un-uniformity from Tribunal to tribunal and even within...as for the tenures, if you wanted to bring him in a judicial officer at the age of 57 and give him a tenure of 3 years, Why would he come?", noted Chief Justice Gogoi.

"Some uniformity must be there. Some places, it (tenure) is 5 years, some places 3. Then there are differences of salaries. As it is, some tribunals are under operating under the old Acts, while others are under the new one", concurred Justice N. V. Ramana.

"Suppose Your Lordships decide that the decision of the Speaker as to the certification is final, or even if it is not final, the whole of the Act is upheld as a money bill, and even the contention of excessive delegation is rejected, then a smaller bench may hash out the discrepancies and monitor other aspects like the maintenance of independence, not giving of unacceptable benefits...These tribunals have come to stay and exercise the judicial powers of the State...However, If excessive delegation fails, then the parliament may frame the rules as suitable to Your Lordships...", suggested Mr. Venugopal.

The five-judge bench reserved its verdict on Tuesday.

The Supreme Court has held that the employees of the local bodies like Municipalities are entitled for gratuity under Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

Former UP CM and BSP Chief Maywati has filed a counter-affidavit in the Supreme Court defending the decision to spend public money on the construction of statues of herself, Kanshi Ram and BSP symbol elephant in UP.

Mayawati said in her affidavit that the building of statues represented the will of the people.

She stated that her life was dedicated to espouse the cause of dalits and that she decided to remain unmarried to pursue the goal of upliftment of downtrodden. As Chief Minister, she had launched many welfare scheme for the marginalized and her noble deeds were widely appreciated by people, she said. 

"The will of the people was expressed by the State Legislature with a proposal to install the statues of the answering respondent at the memorials to show their respect to contemporary women Dalit leader who has decided to sacrifice her life for the cause of underprivileged communities", she  said in the affidavit.

She added that the memorials and statues of herself and other leaders were "intended to promote values and ideals of various sants, gurus, social reformers and leaders among the public and not intended to promote the symbol of BSP or to glorify"

The counter affidavit is filed in opposition to a PIL filed in 2009 against the construction of statues of Mayawati, her mentor Kanshi Ram and elephants - her party Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)'s symbol - at parks in Lucknow and Noida with taxpayers' money when she was chief minister between 2007 and 2012.  The plea alleged hundreds of crores of public money was spent to "falsely glorify" the Chief Minister.

Mayawati termed the PIL as "politically motivated" and said that the petitioners had not questioned the construction of statues by other parties at other places in the country.

She said funds for construction of the memorial and installation of statues were sanctioned through budgetary allocations after approval of the budget by the state legislature. She has further said that the wisdom of the executive in utilizing the funds cannot be called into question by Court.  

While hearing the petition on February 8, the CJI-led bench had orally remarked that the Mayawati should reimburse the public money she had spent for installing statues

"Madam Mayawati, reimburse to the exchequer the public money you spent on the elephants.We are of tentative view that you (Mayawati) should pay the public money from your pocket," CJI strongly observed and asked senior advocate Rakesh Khanna, counsel for Mayawati, to convey to her the Court's view.

(Image Courtesy : Live Mint)

Read Affidavit

Supreme Court Vs RTI  [Day-1 Session-2]

AG KK Venugopal for Supreme Court 

"What would have happen if this personal information, which is protected against disclosure under section 8(1)(j) (of the RTI Act) had something to do with a person's appointment in a public office?", asked Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi during the hearing on the Supreme Court's own appeal against the application of the RTI Act to the judiciary.

"It depends on the method of selection, chances of abuse of power and allegations which prima facie show some wrong as a result of the appointment. In such a case, disclosure may be made. But if no reason is given for how the information sought is in the larger public interest, then it would be third party invasion on personal information", replied AG K. K. Venugopal.

"Say, 'ABC' is recommended for elevation (to the Supreme Court) as against 'XYZ' who is relatively senior. As a broader proposition, what is the extent of the disclosure to be made while, at the same time, protecting the independence?", the Chief Justice probed further.

"If (j) covers me, then I am exempted...", the AG reiterated.

"Even if (j) covers, we have 8(2) that we used in the Rafale case. Even if you are exempted, the disclosure is not barred. The authority only has to see the overwhelming (public) interest. If you have to disclose the various entities in the decision-making process, you will feel shy. They won't allow the information they give to be brought into the public domain. Again, disclosing the reasons (for rejection for elevation or appointment) would destroy the career and family life of the rejected judges/lawyers. So some balancing had to be done...", observed the Chief Justice.

"Suppose it a normal application, then no reasons will be disclosed. If I know it will affect his privacy, then the larger public interest has to be seen. How will the CPIO know if larger public interest is involved? For this purpose, I have to give reasons (in the application) and a judicial decision on that will be then taken...The question is whether there should be a disclosure at all. The second stage would be to allow it in public interest. In case of the latter, there has to be a class of information. For the purpose of the elevation of a judge, the whole of it relates to a class of information which is highly sensitive- the Collegium has to function with total confidentiality which is important for the functioning of the institution itself. Free and frank discussions among the Collegium members and the independence of the judges not considered for elevation, which is all a part of the Basic Structure, will all stand invaded otherwise. This class of information as to functioning of the Collegium could cause great damage to the institution itself...", explained the AG.

"What about the assets of judges?", posed Chief Justice Gogoi.

"As to the assets of judges, Your Lordships should allow the larger public interest test to apply. It is also personal information and affects privacy. But it has to be seen if the larger public interest over weighs (the harm to the protected interest)", responded Mr. Venugopal.

He pointed how even the All-India service Rules require the filing of a return of assets and liabilities and of immovable property outside India. Similar provisions in respect of the Members of Parliament, the Lokpal and Lokyuktas and Panchayats were hashed out.

"All public servants, by the nature of the function they exercise, have the power to misuse their position. They may acquire huge wealth in the process. That is against public interest and affects the confidence of the public in the judiciary and the independence judiciary. Before it is asked to do so, the judiciary is itself seeking to self-regulate by way of voluntary declarations", advanced the AG.

As the Chief Justice assured that the judiciary is now partially succeeding in this behalf, the AG stated that the success is not in full as all High Courts are not willing to fall in line.

"Disclosure is one thing. The other thing is putting it in public domain. These two are different...", reflected Chief Justice Gogoi.

As the AG suggested that in respect of every public servant, the disclosure has been made public (before an amendment in 2016, the Lokpal Act mandated the declaration to be placed on the website, he added), the Chief Justice pointed out that in the Lok Sabha, the declaration is addressed to the Speaker and not published on any website. Justice N. V. Ramana noted that before elections, the candidates are required to file a list of properties, the AG confirmed, saying that otherwise the election may be set aside.

"Whether there is greater public interest in putting the disclosure in public domain or not, Your Lordships can determine. For the MPs, it makes no difference because when they take oath, they anyway give details of their assets and liabilities. But there is no law to compel judges (to make a declaration) as judges usually are placed on a different footing. If a law is made, they will say that the independence of the judiciary is being encroached on by reason of the compulsion. That is why they have begun to disclose voluntarily. I don't see a reason why it cannot be revealed in public", continued Mr. Venugopal.

"There are changes every year, deletions from their acquisitions.There are judges who started off very rich but who are poor today. How many are interested in knowing that?", commented the Chief Justice on a humorous note.

"Their salaries may be increased...", quipped the AG, repeating that the declaration of assets of even the judges be disclosed.

In respect of another connected matter of the alleged attempt of a Union Minister to influence Justice R. Reghupathy in 2009, then a judge of the Madras High Court, the AG, regarding the issue as "very serious", emphasised that a disclosure as to the identity of the minister and of the advocate who assisted him "has to be disclosed".

Earlier, he had vehemently opposed for the correspondences on the supersession of judges or rejection of lawyers for elevation to be made public, going as far as stating that "to do so would be to put an end to the Collegium system itself"-

"What is communicated to the collegium by the Chief Justice of the High Court, what is communicated to the collegium from various quarters including the IB, what is communicated to the government and any reply of the government is of utmost confidentiality. So far as the Collegium is concerned, they have to have free and frank discussions. It is of maximum importance that the wide area to be looked into by them is not curtailed or subject to circumspection".

"When you are overlooking a senior judge or a senior Chief Justice, Your Lordships would not send a letter to any of those judges, saying that you have gone through their background and records and you are satisfied that public interest demands that their junior be recommended and ask them for their response. That would open a pandora's box".

"The moment it is known to the bar that a judge of a High Court is being considered for elevation, at least 50-60 frivolous complaints come in against him. Even a rival judge may engage in such acts...I have no doubt that when Your Lordships overlook a senior judge, you give reasons for it. Assuming the reason is his integrity- there is no way of proving that; it is only something deciphered from a large number of reports from CJ of the High Court or the Collegium of the High Court"

"It is possible that Your Lordships have analysed the best and worst judgments of the judge and feel that he doesn't seem to have any concept of Constitutional law. But whatever Your Lordships may say, it hurts the person who is being overlooked. Just sending back of recommendations by the government is highly controversial"

"Look at the catastrophic effect of the RTI which asks for everything to be disclosed.

Here is an innocent person, a judge of the High Court or a lawyer. He has not applied for elevation but suddenly there are talks in the public that this lawyer is known for taking clients' money and not returning it. One of you may say you come from the same High Court and you know him, then how can he go back to that High Court? He stands humiliated, his family is ostracized, he faces insult at the hands of colleagues insult, his independence is affected. Can he then function as a judge of the High Court? His entire future is ruined! The public, the clients lose confidence in him! He is left as a person who is isolated from the normal intercourse with family and friends...there is a need for total confidentiality otherwise even Your Lordships cannot be function properly. Even if the Collegium unanimously satisfied of the immorality on the part of a person, they may hesitate in stating it as a reason lest it harm his reputation..." 

Following the Bombay High Court's dismissal of PIL filed by one Satish Gaikwad seeking stay on release of biopic based on Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the petitioner has now moved the Supreme Court seeking leave to appeal against the said order of dismissal.

In an important judgment in the realm of gender rights, a full bench of Uttarakhand High Court has held that non-inclusion of "a married daughter" in the definition of a "family", and denying her the opportunity of being considered for compassionate appointment, even though she was dependent on the Government servant at the time of his death, is gender discrimination and thus violative of fundamental rights.

The proposition of disclosure of the correspondences between the highest functionaries in the judiciary and the government regarding the super-session of relatively senior judges and the rejection of advocates for elevation witnessed an intriguing exchange between the Supreme Court five-judge bench and lawyer Prashant Bhushan on Thursday.

"Of late, we are experiencing good people, who have opted to become judges, withdrawing their consent. On interaction, the reason appears to be the possibility of the negative observations, whether rightly or wrongly, being brought into the public domain. In such a case, not only does he not become a judge, but his reputation, his professional life, his family life are all adversely affected", reflected Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, however, clarifying that it is nobody's case that there is a claim of privilege under section 123 of the Evidence Act over such correspondences between the Law Minister, the state government and the Collegium.

Regarding the forty-year old S. P. Gupta judgment (relying on which the disclosure of the said communications was directed by the CIC in 2009), the Chief Justice observed, "Old is gold! We know the value of gold! (Laughter)...but S. P. Gupta was a in a different regime (Mr. Bhushan conceded that the government had control over the appointments then). Even without the RTI Act, some principles are being followed. Do you know that we are even interacting with the prospective candidates now? We are spending 10-15 minutes with each candidate! Do you know from how many sources we get inputs and from how many sources we re-verify the inputs?"

"Nobody is for a system of opaqueness. Nobody wants to remain in the state of darkness or keep anybody in the state of darkness. The question is drawing a line. In the name of transparency, you can't destroy the institution...there was a case where a District Judge of Madras was being considered for the High Court. Ultimately, he was not deemed fit and the reasons were set out. The result was that then he didn't even get an extension of two years which everybody gets as a matter of rule because he was not found fit to be a High Court judge. All his colleagues who were not even in the zone of consideration for the High Court got the extension, but not only did he not become a High Court judge, he retired at 58!", continued Chief Justice Gogoi.

In response to the explanation afforded by Mr. Bhushan for the aforesaid incident, the Chief Justice asserted, "Let us not assume any judge has an animus against anybody, let alone the Chief Justice. Otherwise, the institution will dissolve. We are not prepared to accept (the assumption) because it is not right! We have some procedures. Even with the change of the individual, the decisions don't change!"

Mr. Bhushan proceeded to cite the example of a lawyer of a High Court whose name was reiterated by the High Court Collegium two times until it was finally recalled on being returned by the government for the third time-

"Are the people of this country not entitled to know the reason that prevailed with the Collegium and the government?", he asked

"This is an extreme example that you have given. And there you are very right. So where do we draw the line? A second time reiteration is not the procedure but it has happened! This is a case where the reasons should be made public", agreed the Chief Justice, adding to Mr. Bhushan in a lighter vein,

"You are not wrong all the time. But you are not even right all the time"

"For the class of documents pertaining to the selection process, Are you making a nuanced argument that everything need not be disclosed? That only somethings need to be made public having regard to the nature of the information? Because Not everything in the Selection process has a public interest...some of it is information personal to an individual", weighed in Justice D. Y. Chandrachud.

"Suppose a proposed appointee is a homosexual and the government objects to the recommendation on that ground. And that is overridden by the collegium which then makes a reiteration. Here, the correspondence may be disclosed but not the detail as to his personal sexual orientation. The question is will public interest override (the protected interest)? Suppose his appointment is denied on this ground. Then public interest would outweigh (the purported harm by the disclosure) and it has to be disclosed! Because the denial is on a ground which people would consider irrelevant. Similar would be the case where an appointee is rejected for being a Christian or a Muslim...", explained the Counsel.

As the Chief Justice concurred that there cannot be a blanket embargo on disclosure and that it has to be examined on a case-to-case basis, Justice Deepak Gupta pointed out that if the appointee himself does not want a disclosure as to his sexuality, a line would have to be drawn as otherwise it would be "very dangerous".

Agreeing, the Chief Justice also noted that the best test would be to ask the person himself if he wants the reasons to be placed in public.

"If I hold a public office, then there is public interest in declaring my assets. There is an interest in knowing. But while the name is being considered for appointment, the candidate must necessarily accept that there will be a scrutiny? That is where balancing comes in...", reflected Justice Chandrachud.

"Suppose an objection is taken to the appointment on the ground that he is medically unfit and yet he is appointed to the post that needs a level of medical fitness. Now a RTI application seeks disclosure of the correspondence. The medical affairs may as such be personal information but that is relevant for the purpose of him holding a public office", replied Mr. Bhushan.

"There will be a distinction between suffering a medical condition and what the medical condition is. Suppose a judge applied for a transfer because his wife is suffering a medical condition. She has schizophrenia and he wishes to be transferred to a place where the best treatment is available. This is a classical case of not disclosing what is personal", observed Justice Chandrachud.

Agreeing, Mr. Bhushan advanced that he is in fact placing two qualifications to any disclosure- the information which are exempted under any of the sub-clauses of section 8(1) of the RTI Act, particularly information deemed personal under (j); and secondly, the option of severing the record and disclosing only a part of the information, as envisaged in section 10 of the Act.

In as much as AG K. K. Venugopal had argued on Wednesday that a disclosure of the communications in question would hamper the candour and frankness of the Collegium members in freely indicating the reasons for a rejection, the Chief Justice drew the court's attention to an observation in S. P. Gupta that holders of high constitutional offices such as the Chief Justice of a High Court and the Chief Justice of India are not made of such weak stuff that they would hesitate to express their views if they apprehend subsequent disclosure- "The Attorney had some observations on this", quipped the Chief Justice, much to the amusement of the court.

The judge proceeded to remark, "Our experiences for the last fifty years have demonstrated that the functioning in the other jurisdictions are not the same as here. It is all wishful thinking. Look at the ground realities of which you are more aware than us! Every decision is tainted and painted in a brush that it should not...there might be other perspectives but there is a need to develop trust. Somewhere you have to trust something"

Further, the AG had yesterday regarded the opinion of the seven judges in S. P. Gupta as "idealistic", in as much as they, according to him, had not contemplated the impact of a full disclosure on the independence of the judiciary. As Mr. Bhushan put forth that if the judgment was to be overruled, a nine-judge bench would be needed.

"When the three judges in 2016, in a bench presided by me, had referred the matter to a five-judge bench, how did Mr. bhushan react? As if the court is shirking its responsibility. You had vehemently opposed the reference. And you were right because it took us three years to come with this combination", remarked Chief Justice Gogoi on a humorous note.

When Mr. Bhushan said that he had opposed the reference because there was no ground to overrule S. P. Gupta, the Chief Justice noted, "Nothing needs to be overruled. (The issue is) how do we fine-tune our experience of fifty years.

It is a question of trust- how far you can go. S. P. Gupta established the ideals of Transparency in the functioning and of openness in public life. But at the same time, some balancing is needed...like (Justice Chandrachud) pointed out yesterday that even in some of the exemption clauses (in section 8(1) of the RTI Act), some balancing is there (allowing for disclosure if the public interest so warrants). And finally, there is 8(2) (allowing a disclosure even under the Official Secrets Act or under any of the exempted heads in section 8(1) if the public interest outweighs the protected interest)"

"You read some of our recent Collegium resolutions and see the departures. See How things have been balanced...", the Chief Justice suggested to Mr. Bhushan.

Continuing, Chief Justice Gogoi elaborated, "There was a district judge who was appointed as a High Court judge. After two years, he was not given an extension and was reverted back. He challenged this decision. We called for the collegium records and showed it to him, and just by seeing the reasoning of the Collegium, he didn't want to pursue his petition before us any more. Now Imagine if those reasons were disclosed, then what would have happened? There can't be blanket ban, yes. But it has to be seen on a case-to-case basis" 

In order to attract the rigor of section 197 Cr.P.C. the offence alleged against a Government Officer must have some nexus with the discharge of his official duties as Government Officer, held the Supreme Court.

"In our view, in order to attract the rigor of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., it is necessary that the offence alleged against a Government Officer must have some nexus or/and relation with the discharge of his official duties as a Government Officer", held the bench of Justices A M Sapre and Dinesh Maheswari.

Section 197 Cr.P.C. deals with prosecution of Judges and Public Servants wherein sanction of the Government is stipulated for taking cognizance of an offence alleged to have been committed while actiing or purporting to act in discharge of his duties.

The Court was considering an appeal against the order of the High Court of Patna wherein the Court quashed the order of the First Class Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance of the complaint filed by the appellant against the respondent, Police Officer (SHO) for the offences punishable under sections 323, 341, 379 and 504 of IPC.

The complaint was quashed by the High Court of Patna for two fold reasons, firstly, that no sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. was obtained by the prosecution for filing the complaint and secondly, on the finding that there are contradictions in the stamen of the complaint and the witnesses.

The bench comprising of Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre and Justice Dinesh Maheshwari observed that the grounds for quashing the complaint is not well founded and therefore not legally sustainable.

Having regard to the nature of the offences alleged in the complaint against the Police Officer, no prior sanction under section 197 Cr.P.C. was required since it cannot be said that the respondent committed the alleged offences while acting in discharge of his official duties or while purporting to act in discharge of his official duties, opined the Court.

While allowing the appeal and restoring the compliant to its original file, the court held that the High Court had no jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C. to appreciate the statement of witnesses and to record the inconsistencies in their statements. 

Read Judgment

The Supreme Court has observed that grant of interim mandatory injunction is not prohibited, and it can granted in 'appropriate' cases.

The Bombay High Court on Wednesday passed landmark directions after hearing three petitions filed by women seeking permission to medically terminate their pregnancy. The length of their respective pregnancies had exceeded 20 weeks.

Division bench of Justice AS Oka and Justice MS Sonak held that a registered medical practitioner may medically terminate pregnancy which has exceeded 20 weeks, without permission from the High Court, only when he is of the opinion, that the termination of such pregnancy is immediately necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman.

Court further held that in a case where attempts are made to medically terminate a pregnancy in good faith to save the life of the mother and still the child is born alive, the State will have to assume parental responsibility, if the parents of such child are unwilling to or genuinely not in a position to care for such child.

Although, Court had allowed medical termination of the three respective pregnancies, the petitions were kept pending as important issues were raised in the petition. Court said-

"This is because several such petitions are being filed in this Court seeking urgent reliefs. In matters of this nature, every passing day produces irretrievable changes in the status of the petitioners and foetus which they carry. These changes invariably have a direct impact upon the reliefs applied for in such petitions."

Thus, Court appointed Senior Advocate DJ Khambatta as the Amicus Curiae in the matter.

MTP Act and Right to Life

The Medical termination of Pregnancy Act was enacted on April 1, 1972 to provide for the termination of certain pregnancies by registered medical practitioners. The said act was amended in 2002.

After examining various judgement of the Supreme Court, the bench observed-

"From the conspectus of the decisions of the Supreme Court, it is quite clear that the Supreme Court has construed the provisions in section 5 of the MTP Act, not narrowly by adopting the principle of literal construction but liberally by adopting the principle of purposive construction. The Supreme Court has consistently permitted medical termination of pregnancies which had exceeded the ceiling of 20 weeks where medical opinion established that continuance of pregnancy involved grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman or where there was substantial risk that if the child were born, it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped. This was despite the fact that there was no immediate danger to the life of the pregnant mother."

If the expression "life" in section 5(1) of the MTP Act is not to be confined to mere physical existence or survival, then, permission will have to be granted under section 5 (1) of the MTP Act for medical termination of pregnancy which may have exceeded 20 weeks, if the continuance of such pregnancy would involve grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman, Court said.

Court noted that the moot question with regard to life and right to life is-

"Whether the expression "life" in section 5 of the MTP Act must be construed narrowly by adopting the principle of literal interpretation or liberally by adopting the principle of purposive interpretation?"

Court noted further-

"Reference can be usefully made to several decisions rendered by Supreme Court in which medical termination of pregnancy was permitted beyond the ceiling period of 20 weeks as prescribed in section 3 (2) of the MTP Act where the continuance of pregnancy involved grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman or where there was substantial risk that if the child were born, it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped. This means that the principle of narrow or literal construction was not adopted when it came to interpretation of the provisions in section 5 of the MTP Act by the Supreme Court in several cases. Rather, the principle of liberal or purposive interpretation was adopted."

Judgement

The bench referred to the judgement of a Constitution bench of the Supreme Court in M Nagraj vs Union of India on right to life and human dignity and State's responsibility to facilitate the rights, liberties and freedoms of individuals and said-

"Therefore, if the child, despite attempts at medical termination of pregnancy, is born alive, then the parents as well as the Doctors owe a duty of care to such child. The best interest of the child must be the central consideration in determining how to treat the child.

Unfortunately, if the parents are unwilling to take care of the child or are not in a position to take care of the child, then, the "parens patriae" doctrine, will oblige the State to assume parental responsibility in relation to such child. Even apart from the said doctrine, the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, will apply to such an unfortunate situation."

Thus, Court held that a registered medical practitioner may medically terminate a pregnancy exceeding 20 weeks without taking permission of the Court only when here is immediate danger to the life of the mother. In any other circumstance, permission of the High Court is mandatory.

"We further hold that where, this Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has permitted medical termination of pregnancy and the child is born alive, if the parents of such child are not willing to or are not in a position to assume the responsibility for such child, then, the State and its agencies will have to assume full responsibility for such child and offer such child medical support and facilities, as may be reasonably feasible" Court said.

The bench also directed the State to constitute medical boards in each district in order to examine cases of women seeking medical termination of pregnancy. The State has also been directed to emphasize on providing facilities to women in rural areas with regard to their hygiene and health.

Read Judgment

As the Supreme Court five-judge bench resumed hearing on Thursday on the court's own appeals against the judiciary being subject to the RTI regime, Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi clarified that one of the contentious issues- the disclosure of the identity of the union minister who had in 2009 attempted to influence Justice R. Regupathy of the Madras High Court for a favourable judgment- was no longer alive.

Attorney General K. K. Venugopal (who appeared for the Central Public Information Officer of the apex court) had on Wednesday stressed on the seriousness of the matter, insisting that the names of the Union Minister and his advocate be revealed.

Further, he had favoured even the judges' declaration of their assets to be appropriately published, eventually leaving it to the court to decide the question.

So Advocate Prashant Bhushan, for the respondent, RTI activist Subhash Chandra Agarwal, addressed the court on why the correspondence between the highest functionaries in the Judiciary and the Executive pertaining to the supersession of relatively senior judges and the rejection of lawyers for elevation must also be placed in the public domain.

At the outset, Mr. Bhushan submitted that the court, being a judge in its own cause in the present matter, is acting as a court of necessity. The issue of transparency having been raised in context of the information which resides with the Supreme Court, it should not be hearing the case, but since there is no other court which could decide the matter, it acts as the court of necessity, he advanced.

He commenced his discourse referring to the 1975 State of UP v. Raj Narain where a constitution bench of this court had rejected the claim of privilege on the Blue Book on the security arrangements of the Prime Minister, observing that the people of this country are the real masters and they are entitled to know what their public servants are doing.

Next, he canvassed the 1981 S. P. Gupta case, where a 7-judge bench had dealt with the question of the disclosure of the communications between the Law Minister, the CJI and the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court as to the non-elevation of two lawyers as permanent judges of the High Court who had earlier been appointed as additional judges. It was this decision which was heavily relied upon by the Central Information Commission in directing in 2009 the disclosure of the correspondence regarding the elevation of Justices R. M. Lodha, H. L. Dattu and A. P. Ganguly to the top court in supersession of Justices A. P. Shah, A. K. Patnaik and V. K. Gupta.

Describing the judgment as "idealistic", the AG had yesterday argued that the candour and the frankness of the Collegium members would be affected if they apprehended a subsequent disclosure of the reasons for their rejection of a proposed appointee. Besides, in view of the damage to the professional and family life of the appointee, he had warned of the independence of the judiciary being further sabotaged, which he had asserted had not been considered in S. P. Gupta.

Mr. Bhushan, in his turn, advanced that both these arguments had been dealt and rejected by the seven judges, who had held that public interest requires disclosure to avert nepotism ans arbitrariness in judicial appointments- "the IB had given a report on one of the proposed appointees that he was an alcoholic and that his nickname is 'boozer'. Can this information not be revealed?", the Counsel asked.

Moving on, Mr. Bhushan relied on RBI v. Jayantilal Mistry (2015), where, Coming down heavily on the RBI for withholding information under the RTI Act, the Supreme Court had declared that the RBI cannot place itself in a fiduciary relationship with the banks and other Financial institutions.

What followed was a discussion on this aspect of fiduciary relationship vis-a-vis disclosure between the Advocate and Justice Sanjiv Khanna-

"In the CBSE case (of 2011 where the apex court had mandated that the CBSE supply the answer scripts of students under the RTI Act), it was held that the name of the examiner would not be revealed. Because if someone is giving away that detail, he is breaking the fiduciary relationship (between the examining body and the evaluator). Similarly, in the case a whistle blower has given information to the CVC with the stipulation to not reveal his name. Then what happens?", asked the judge.

Mr. Bhushan replied that this information would be exempted from disclosure under sub-clause (g) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act (as that the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person), and even sub-clause (e) (as information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship) as suggested by Justice Khanna.

"The true test is if you're providing the information in the trust and confidence of the person who is obligated to act in your interest- like in the case of lawyer-client, doctor-patient, company-in-house CA relationships. But a public servant, in the discharge of his public duty, is not acting for the benefit of anyone. So if he asks for his name to not be revealed, it cannot be so, unless the name is irrelevant. Say, Someone makes a recommendation for awarding a contract to so and so. Can then his name not be relevant?", continued the lawyer.

"The RBI is acting in its capacity of the regulator of banks. Not for the benefit of any bank. Similarly, the high functionaries carrying out the appointment of judges are not acting in a fiduciary manner", he proposed.

"The RBI governor writes a letter to a higher authority including a list of 16 bank defaulters, who are not just defaulters but fraudsters, and asks for them to be caught before they can run away. Not only nothing is done, but when the Parliamentary committee asks for this information from that higher authority, it is denied! That is how many people have managed to run away from the country!", contended Mr. Bhushan passionately.

"Your Lordships invited applications for the designation of senior advocates which were even put up on a public website. But in the case of prospective judges, AG had said that people will make absurd allegations, scurrilous and defamatory. That even applies to senior advocates. People will make allegations but if they are without substance, they can be thrown into the waste paper basket! If they are made without evidence, even on circumstance, then that would amount to defamation!", he urged.

In the light of the NJAC Act (which contemplated the involvement of the Law Minister and PM-nominees in judicial appointments) having been struck down, Mr. Bhushan expressed that the independence of the judiciary sought is from the executive and the Legislature, and not from accountability and the citizenry- "There is Nothing to say that sitting judges must select judges, but just that the executive must not. In the UK, there are independent bodies doing it by laying down the criteria, inviting applications and then scrutinizing them scientifically. There is transparency as to the reasons for selection. In the US, there is a confirmation hearing which is a totally public hearing!"

He contended that though the court has been an ardent supporter of openness and transparency in other public agencies, it has not been so forthcoming as to information residing within itself-

"For all other functionaries, there is one law on disclosure of even file notings as to selections, But judges inhabit a different universe!...When information was sought as to how many judgments have been reserved and for what length of time, both the CIC and the single judge of the High Court had said that this information should be disclosed. But the SC went to the division bench which then reversed it. The Appeal to the SC was also dismissed. Even that information is not being given! How should people then suggest reforms? The system then remains a black box which people can see but say nothing about for the fear of contempt and for the lack of information!"

The bench reserved its verdict on the issue on Thursday.

The Supreme Court on Friday refused urgent listing of a plea seeking a stay on the release of the biopic on Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

A bench headed by Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi said, "What biopic? We have not seen it. Perhaps we will watch it over the weekend, then you mention."

The bench told the lawyer, who mentioned the plea for urgent listing, that it will come up in the regular course of hearing.

The apex court had on Thursday agreed to hear on April 8 a Congress leader's plea which sought deferment of the biopic's release till the completion of the upcoming Lok Sabha polls, alleging that it was designed to "manipulate, influence and impress viewers and voters".

Titled 'PM Narendra Modi', the biopic, which was slated to be released on April 5, has been postponed till further notice, its producer Sandip Singh had said on Thursday.

The Indore bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court had on Wednesday rejected a plea seeking ban on the release.

The Bombay High Court also had on Monday disposed of a plea seeking deferment of the biopic's release, saying the Election Commission will deal with the issue.

The Supreme Court on Friday refused to hear pleas challenging the constitutional validity of recent Aadhaar ordinance brought by the Centre and asked the petitioners to approach the high court with their grievances.

A bench of justices S A Bobde and S A Nazeer said it is not expressing anything on the merits of the case and would like to have the view of the high court on the issue.

"We would like to have advantage of view of the high court," the bench said.

Senior advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi, appearing for one of the petitioners, told the bench that it was a matter of "national importance" as it will have a pan-India effect and the apex court should decide the issue.

To this, the bench said, "We are not saying we do not have the power to entertain this".

"The counsel appearing for the petitioners pray for withdrawal of these petitions with liberty to approach the high court. Prayer is allowed. Accordingly, the writ petitions are dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty aforesaid," the bench said in its order.

President Ram Nath Kovind had last month given his assent to the Aadhaar Ordinance that allowed voluntary use of Aadhaar as ID proof for obtaining mobile SIM cards and opening bank accounts.

The ordinance was necessitated because Rajya Sabha could not approve a Bill after its passage by Lok Sabha.

The Cabinet had approved the promulgation of an ordinance to give effect to changes proposed in Aadhaar and two others legislations.

The amendments provide for stiff penalties for violation of norms set for the use of Aadhaar and violation of privacy.

It bans storing of core biometric information as well as Aadhaar number by service providers in cases of individuals who have voluntarily offered the national ID as a means of authentication.

However, the amendments make it clear that anyone not offering Aadhaar cannot be denied any service, be it opening of a bank account or obtaining a mobile phone SIM card.

A five-judge Constitution bench of the apex court had in September last year declared the Centre's flagship Aadhaar scheme as constitutionally valid but struck down some of its provisions including its linking with bank accounts, mobile phones and school admissions.

The court had held that while Aadhaar would remain mandatory for filing of Income Tax returns and allotment of Permanent Account Number (PAN), it would not be mandatory to link Aadhaar to bank accounts and telecom service providers cannot seek its linking for mobile connections.

The Supreme Court today stayed the Delhi High Court's eviction order against Associated Journal's Limited(AJL) - the publisher of Congress mouthpiece National Herald - from ITO premises in New Delhi.

On February 28, the division bench of the Delhi High Court had upheld that eviction order passed under the Public Premises Act by Centre and the Land and Development Office(LDO) against AJL stating that no press has been functioning in the premises for at least the past 10 years and that it was being used only for commercial purposes in violation of the lease deed. The order was passed in the backdrop of majority of shares of AJL being transferred to the company Young India (YI), in which Congress chief Rahul Gandhi and his mother Sonia Gandhi are shareholders.

Earlier, a single bench of the High Court had refused to interfere with the eviction order.The bench took note of the fact that AJL has been taken over by Young Indian Company for all practical purposes. It said: "This Court is conscious of the fact that Young Indian Company is a charitable company, but modus operandi to acquire 99% of AJL's shares speaks volumes. The manner in which it has been done is also questionable."

The division bench too upheld the single bench's view that the entire transaction of transferring the shares of AJL to Young India was nothing but a clandestine and surreptitious transfer of the lucrative interest in the premises to Young India.

It was found that by transfer of AJL's 99 per cent shares to YI, the beneficial interest of AJL's property worth Rs 413.40 crore stands "clandestinely" transferred to YI.

AJL had contended that even a 100 percent shareholder of a company would not become the owner of its assets. The Centre had contended before the court that transfer of 99 per cent stake in AJL to YI, when the latter bought the former's Rs 90 crore debt for a consideration of Rs 50 lakh, led to a "virtual" sale.

In its plea, AJL has also said the digital versions of English newspaper National Herald, Hindi's Navjivan and Urdu's Qaumi Awaz have commenced from 2016-17. The weekly newspaper 'National Herald on Sunday' resumed on September 24, 2017, and the place of publication was the ITO premises, AJL said, adding that the Hindi weekly newspaper Sunday Navjivan was being published since October last year from the same premises.